Recently, the clause on “sealing detention records” in the “Public Security Administration Punishment Law” has suddenly become a hot topic of public opinion, with discussions quickly focusing on the “management of drug users.”
I have written several articles recently and mentioned multiple times that after this incident, the legal community has remained largely silent, including the legislative bodies and public security organs at the center of the controversy, who have also maintained their silence. This implicitly suggests to readers that there is clearly an unusual logic behind this unusual situation.
1. The Timing Is Too Coincidental
The new “Public Security Administration Punishment Law” was passed in June, yet there was almost zero public discussion about it for over half a year.
However, just one month before its implementation on January 1, a six-word comment from the Nantong Culture and Tourism Bureau under an ordinary video instantly ignited public opinion.
At the same time, a batch of local culture and tourism accounts followed suit. Clearly, this is highly unusual.
Anyone with a bit of sensitivity knows what a system written into the plenary session report and a law that has completed the signing process and been promulgated mean in China’s current political environment.
This is clearly not something that can be explained away as an accidental algorithm recommendation.
2. Prerequisites for Reform
According to the 2024 National Drug Situation Report, the number of drug users nationwide has continued to decline in recent years, with official statistics showing 747,000 individuals, while 4.286 million have abstained from drug use for over three years without relapse.
Compared to the first National Drug Situation Report released in 2014, which identified 2.955 million drug users and estimated the actual number nationwide to exceed 14 million, the current figures are relatively more scientific. After all, constrained by technical means, if a large portion of the estimated 14 million have abstained from drug use for a long time, it would be difficult and meaningless to identify them again.
For instance, before the founding of the People’s Republic, opium smoking was common in many places, especially among public officials and military personnel in the Kuomintang government. If these individuals are still alive today, they might have abstained from drugs for over 70 years.
However, since the founding of the People’s Republic, the government has maintained a high-pressure stance against drugs. It was only after the reform and opening-up, when border control became more challenging and the inflow of drugs from abroad increased significantly, that drug-related issues began to rise.
After decades of governance, the drug situation has significantly improved. For example, the number of registered drug users has been declining by about 20% annually in recent years.
Additionally, the number of users of mainstream drugs such as opium and methamphetamine has sharply declined. For instance, in 2022, the numbers fell by 25.2% and 25.8%, respectively; in 2023, by 26.7% and 22.6%; and in 2024, by 28% and 23.3%. This continuous steep decline reflects China’s significant achievements in combating drug production and trafficking at the source. In practice, the increase has mainly been in the abuse of substances such as metomidate, compound tramadol, and dextromethorphan.
This trend is particularly evident in compulsory rehabilitation centers: many facilities have low bed occupancy rates, with some operating at less than half capacity. At the same time, it is not uncommon to hear news of rehabilitation center police officers being transferred to participate in grassroots judicial and administrative work, or even being relocated in batches to local areas with their positions intact.
This indicates two things: the era of administrative compulsory rehabilitation as the “main channel” has undergone profound changes, and the “cost-benefit ratio” of the existing drug rehabilitation execution system has significantly declined.
Against this backdrop, seeking a new governance model is not unreasonable.
3. Practical Difficulties Faced
The current management model for drug users revolves around the dynamic control stipulated in the “Anti-Drug Law.” This control has no time limit and essentially accompanies drug users for life. However, if an individual has abstained from drug use for ten or twenty years, the significance of continuing such measures is difficult to evaluate.
Over the years, the number of individuals requiring continuous control has accumulated to over 4.3 million. Measures such as regular urine tests, hair tests, periodic visits, and community reports are often “nine out of ten times ineffective,” though this is still preferable to discovering actual problems.
Objectively, however, the investment of human, material, and financial resources has gradually become a structural burden. Moreover, it somewhat hinders the reintegration of long-term abstainers into normal life, and frontline workers face heavy workloads.
Of course, these measures were indeed necessary during the earlier severe drug situation, as the prevention capabilities, levels, and technical equipment support at that time were incomparable to today.
However, with the growing number of individuals under control and the decreasing risks, whether it is necessary to maintain high-intensity management in the long term has become a practical issue that must be addressed.
4. Online Public Opinion Lays the Mass Foundation for Reform
In this wave of public opinion, many believe that “sealing detention records” equates to “relaxing penalties for drug use,” which is not entirely unreasonable. This has made “drug control” a hot topic across the internet in a short period, with the public overwhelmingly supporting stricter drug control measures.
This public opinion trend clearly provides a solid mass foundation for optimizing institutional supply and quickly introducing new systems.
Once detention records are sealed, the existing management system will naturally withdraw from the “lifetime management of all individuals with a history of drug use by public security organs,” pushing the public governance structure into the next stage.
The most critical link in this process may be “criminalization.”
Whether it is public concern over “why drug users are only subject to administrative detention” or revisiting Article 85 of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law to question “why instigating or forcing others to use drugs only warrants administrative detention” (which is actually basic first-year criminal law knowledge), the focus of the debate is gradually shifting toward forming a consensus on “criminalization.”
This backlash in public opinion also means that the entire reform “cannot proceed quietly.” Instead, it must enter the upcoming legislative agenda under the premise of widespread public discussion and is likely to become the most closely watched topic in the next legislative activity, subject to further open discussion and debate. This, in itself, is a healthier and more transparent path.
5. Legislative Bodies Become the Center of This Reform
In this public opinion incident, many netizens focused on the issue of “extending the sealing of records from minors to all individuals,” which effectively shifted public attention to specific aspects of the legislative process.
In the past, public attention to legislative procedures was not as in-depth, and the relationships between “drafts for comments,” “deliberation drafts,” and “voting drafts” were often confusing. However, there is no doubt that the public remains most concerned about whether the legislative process is open and transparent.
In fact, since China’s legislative bodies have never engaged in “black-box operations,” this issue is relatively easy to address.
However, such a response may require a special opportunity. The upcoming “Two Sessions” after the Lunar New Year is likely an excellent timing for this.
The more thoroughly legislative bodies respond to such issues and the deeper the discussions, the stronger the credibility of legislation becomes.
Thus, what seems like a chaotic public opinion field may ultimately result in: addressing public concerns > amending laws to establish new systems > enhancing legislative authority > establishing long-term rules.
This outcome is, in fact, rational.
6. Reform Ultimately Evolves Toward the Rule of Law
When last year’s Third Plenary Session proposed improving the national execution system, many speculated privately whether the court’s execution bureau would become independent or be transferred to the Ministry of Justice. However, it now seems this speculation may not be entirely accurate.
Last year, I also expressed my view, suggesting that transferring the execution bureau to the Ministry of Justice might not be a bad idea, as it could achieve a scientific division of investigative, prosecutorial, adjudicative, and execution powers among public security, procuratorates, courts, and judicial organs, eliminating situations where two or more powers are mixed within a single unit.
However, after the incident involving the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, I changed my view. I now believe I may have originally misunderstood the direction.
The statement in the Third Plenary Session does not necessarily refer directly to the separation of the court’s adjudicative and execution powers. It could also refer to the relationship between public security and judicial administrative organs—specifically, the issue of “compulsory rehabilitation institutions” not legally belonging to the “execution power” at the end of judicial procedures.
Previously, since drug rehabilitation was an administrative coercive measure, the entire punishment, education, and control work fell outside judicial procedures, representing one of the few remaining issues in the allocation of law enforcement and judicial powers.
From a practical trend perspective, I personally speculate that the ultimate direction is likely to be:
- Public security gradually withdraws from the daily management of drug users.
- Compulsory rehabilitation centers transition from an administrative coercive system to a judicial execution system.
- Community-based drug rehabilitation gradually becomes judicialized and administrative, moving toward “community correction.”
- The subsequent handling of drug use behavior is uniformly incorporated into the “execution system.”
- Public security focuses on combating upstream serious crimes such as drug trafficking and production.
7. Criminalization Is Not “Shifting the Burden”
The issue of “criminalization” has long been highly controversial in both theoretical and practical circles.
This is mainly because, for a long time, China has maintained high-pressure and efficient measures against drug use, allowing public security organs alone to handle cases through simple administrative procedures without the need for litigation, defense, or avenues for appeal. Coupled with continuous dynamic control measures by public security organs, the practical results have been effective, with the lowest relapse rate globally after release.
However, criminalization would be different. The most significant difference is that once an individual completes their sentence and is “released from punishment,” the penalty is considered fulfilled, and there is no need for subsequent control measures. Even if there are “resettlement and assistance” programs, they lack binding force. Another practical issue is that community correction and post-release management are currently mainly implemented by township judicial offices, which may be perceived as less effective compared to public security organs.
Of course, if “criminalization” is ultimately implemented, and post-sentence management shifts from public security’s dynamic control to judicial administrative organs’ “assistance,” this should not be simply viewed as “shifting the burden.” It is, in fact, an inevitable path toward the modernization of national governance.
It is highly likely that during this reform process, idle compulsory rehabilitation police resources, local judicial administrative organs, the recently established Ministry of Social Work, and the “social governance centers” currently being vigorously developed across the country could all participate in the social management of drug users. This could establish a more modern and adaptable system of work responsibilities.
Especially considering the Third Plenary Session’s proposal to “improve and perfect the national execution system,” the originally fragmented execution systems—such as compulsory rehabilitation centers, community-based drug rehabilitation, community correction, criminal detention, and control—require a unified and sustainable management framework.
“Criminalization"恰好是一个可以自然接轨的入口。
Institutional Evolution and the Inevitable Choice of Rule of Law Modernization
Previously, I wrote several articles addressing specific issues, but unfortunately, influenced by the prevalence of “preconceived notions” online, readers did not accept this approach.
In my personal view, this apparent public opinion storm does not point to a simple “leniency” or “tightening” toward drug users. Instead, it reflects another profound and inevitable self-evolution of China’s governance system on the path toward the rule of law.
Structurally, this reform involves gradually transitioning an administrative “lifetime control” system formed during a historically specific period, which has consumed enormous human and material resources, toward a more efficient, sustainable, and modern judicial execution system aligned with the principles of the rule of law.
This public opinion incident has completed the necessary mobilization and preparation for the upcoming reform:
First, it has laid the “public opinion groundwork” for the graceful exit of the old system: By sparking public concern over “relaxed control,” it has compelled legislative and law enforcement bodies to upgrade the drug governance model at a higher level, creating momentum for reform driven by the public.
Second, it has successfully anchored the core issue of the reform: “criminalization.” Whether questioning the “Public Security Administration Punishment Law” or expressing confusion over the implementation of the “Anti-Drug Law,” the focus has converged on the punitive intensity at the criminal law level, providing a strong foundation of public consensus for subsequent amendments to the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law.
Third, it has pushed legislative bodies to the forefront, enhancing the credibility of the rule of law. With legislative bodies thrust into the spotlight by public opinion, they will inevitably have to explain legislative logic openly and transparently and respond to procedural doubts. This itself is a “public review” of legislative power, and the result will inevitably be a more robust and transparent legislative process.
Therefore, rather than calling this a “public opinion crisis,” it is more accurate to describe it as an institutional self-excitation during a “governance transition period.” It leverages the energy of public sentiment to smoothly achieve structural optimization within the system.
The ultimate goal is not to increase penalties for a specific group but to use more refined legal tools and more sustainable social costs to achieve fairer and more authoritative governance objectives. All participants, whether intentional or not, have become part of the force driving this reform forward.
Of course, the above content is purely my own speculation. From a practical perspective, I am not entirely in favor of “criminalization,” but if it turns out to be accurate, I would still welcome it.